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Abstract
I begin by sketching the Epicurean position on death - that it cannot be bad
for the one who dies because she no longer exists - which has struck many
people as specious. However, alternative views must specify who is wronged
by death (the dead person?), what is the harm (suffering?), and when does the
harm take place (before death, when you’re not dead yet, or after death, when
you’re not around any more?). In the second section I outline the most
sophisticated anti-Epicurean view, the deprivation account, according to
which someone who dies is harmed to the extent that the death has deprived
her of goods she would otherwise have had. In the third section I argue that
deprivation accounts that use the philosophical tool of possible worlds have
the counterintuitive implication that we are harmed in the actual world
because counterfactual versions of us lead fantastic lives in other possible
worlds. In the final section I outline a neo-Epicurean position that explains
how one can be wronged by being killed without being harmed by death and
how it is possible to defend intuitions about injustice without problematic
appeal to possible worlds.
Key Words: Death, deprivation, possible worlds, epicurus, Nagel,
Silverstein, Feldman, McMahan.
*****
1. Introduction
In this chapter I defend the notion that my death will not harm me.
This is not a novel sentiment: it is the view of Epicurus (c. 341-270 BCE),
whose argument for it is contained in his Letter to Menoeceus:
Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us, for
good and evil imply awareness, and death is the privation
of all awareness...
Foolish...is the person who says that he fears death, not
because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in
the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is
present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation.
Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us,
seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when
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death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the
living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the
dead exist no longer.1
I take Epicurus to mean by ‘death’ here the state of being dead, and
accordingly, that is what I mean by it in this chapter. None of what I say
should be taken to apply to dying (which Epicureans can certainly concede to
be harmful) or death as a moment, whereby one can debate whose death is
better, Joan of Arc’s (painful but heroic) or Elvis’ (quick, but, to say the least,
undignified).
Next, a disclaimer: I am not an Epicurus scholar. When I talk about
the Epicurean position, I do not mean to say this is precisely what Epicurus
said or even what he meant. It may be that Epicurus’ real view is not
Epicurean (as Marx is rumoured to have said of Marxists that he was glad he
was not one), but I will not concern myself with such exegesis. With that in
mind, I take the Epicurean position on death to be as follows:
1. The only way one can be harmed is if one experiences
suffering.
2. It is impossible to experience suffering when one does not
exist.
3. When one becomes dead, one ceases to exist.
4. Therefore, one is not harmed by being dead.
To put it succinctly: death won’t be bad for me because I won’t be around.
As Epicurus’ follower Lucretius pointed out, we don’t lament the time of our
non-existence before our births, so we should no more fear the time of our
non-existence after our deaths. That is not, of course, to say that Epicureans
deny that my death will be bad for other people. It is my fervent hope that
upon my death the wailing and gnashing of teeth of my surviving great great
great grandchildren will be heard across the land. (Of course, this hope in
itself is probably as irrational as a fear of death, but even philosophers should
be allowed occasional lapses.)
I find this Epicurean reasoning about death very compelling, but I
must concede that it has counterintuitive implications, not least of which is
that it appears to suggest that attempted murder is worse for the victim than
successful murder. If only Caesar hadn’t had time to say ‘et tu, Brute’ he
would’ve been fine.
However, even if the Epicurean view has these implications, they
are not sufficient to constitute a reductio of the position if the argument for it
cannot be faulted. And, as we shall see, it is not clear that alternative views
fare any better in the strange consequences department.
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The Epicurean position is often met with much snorting and
sputtering. Stephen Rosenbaum, himself an Epicurean about death, reports
that a critic writes that Epicurus’ argument ‘will hardly bear looking into’ and
that ‘Epicurus was not much interested in logic.’2 And Steven Luper-Foy
once wrote:
Epicurus’ famous argument…is about as absurd as any I
have seen…The self-deception of people like Epicurus is
not conscious; we cannot relieve our anxiety by swallowing
beliefs of whose inanity we are aware. But deception is
nonetheless at work.3
One is reminded of David Lewis’s comment about criticisms of his views,
that it is hard to argue with an incredulous stare. Of course, the critics offer
alternatives, most of which fall under what Harry Silverstein has called ‘the
standard argument’4 or what Fred Feldman calls ‘the deprivation approach.’5
In what follows I will consider some of the better-known versions of this
approach and explain why I think each is unsatisfactory. I shall conclude by
attempting to explain away the more counterintuitive implications of the
Epicurean position.
2. No HarmWithout Suffering
Let us make clear the common ground between the Epicureans and
the anti-Epicureans. First, we will assume, as writers on this subject typically
do, that death marks the end of all experience. That is not to rule out by fiat
the possibility of a so-called afterlife, just to deny that it happens during
death. Better to say that those who believe in an afterlife in fact believe in
immortality and deny that death happens. (They needn’t deny the death of
the body, just that the person dies along with it.) With that understanding of
death, very few people deny the third Epicurean premise, which Fred
Feldman dubs the termination thesis, that we cease to exist at death.
Feldman himself is one who does deny it, but not in a way that gives much
solace to those approaching death. Although he calls himself a ‘survivalist’
to distinguish himself from so-called ‘terminators’ who accept the claim,
Feldman’s position is a mixed bag. I quote:
The good news is that most of us will survive death. Most
of us will continue to exist after we die. The bad news is
that though we will survive death, and will continue to exist
after we die, each of us will then be dead… We will just be
corpses.6
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In something of an understatement he concedes, ‘such survival may be of
very little value.’ Feldman’s position follows from his view that we are our
bodies, and while that view has some advantages (for example, it makes
sense of statements like ‘we’re burying Aunt Ethel today’), it does not really
capture what we care about. So I shall assume the termination thesis in what
follows. Even if one did not, however, one would still be forced to accept
EPD 2 (to which we could add that should we continue to exist as corpses,
we won’t be suffering either), which is as uncontroversial as any claim in
philosophy can be.
That leaves EPD 1, which we could call the ‘No Harm Without
Suffering’ principle, as the only weak spot in the Epicurean argument, and it
is indeed on this that the critics focus. Of Epicurus’ contemporary critics,
undoubtedly the most well-known is Thomas Nagel, who points out its
implications:
It means that even if a man is betrayed by his friends,
ridiculed behind his back, and despised by people who treat
him politely to his face, none of it can be counted as a
misfortune for him so long as he does not suffer as a
result.7
Nagel here offers plausible candidates for harms that do not involve
suffering. But let us look closer at his ‘misfortunes’. The first thing I would
suggest about them is that, in considering these cases, one cannot help
imagining the poor sap finding out about the betrayal and ridicule, and this is
where the real harm occurs. If that is so, then these cease to be examples of
harm without suffering. To press the point, imagine that he finds out and
really doesn’t care. He is the remarkable man who forgives all, and has no
ego that can be damaged. Wouldn’t we say then that he had never been
harmed, and precisely because he doesn’t suffer?
Even if this point does not convince, a second thing to point out is
that all of his examples involve other people acting with ill intent towards the
blissfully unaware target of their venom. But death itself (that is, the state of
being dead, not the titular Grim Reaper) cannot betray or ridicule one.8 In
fact, I would suggest that Nagel’s misfortunes are (at best) examples of
wrongs rather than harms. Now, in saying that I am suggesting that there can
be wrongs without harms, a claim that I suspect Epicurus would reject.
Nonetheless, I will explore this suggestion later in the chapter, as I believe
that making that distinction allows an Epicurean to maintain that killing can
be wrong even when it does not harm the victim.
In sum, I maintain that Nagel’s list of misfortunes do not constitute
obvious counterexamples to the No Harm Without Suffering principle. But
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he has another example that does not seem open to the challenges I mounted
against the list, and here it is:
Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that
reduces him to the mental condition of a contented infant,
and that such desires as remain to him can be satisfied by a
custodian, so that he is free from care. Such a development
would be widely regarded as a severe misfortune, not only
for his friends and relations, or for society, but also, and
primarily, for the person himself.9
Clearly this is intended to be an example of harm without suffering, because
it is stressed that the post-injury individual is ‘contented,’ yet there is no
doubt that we are inclined to say, as Nagel does, that he has undergone a
serious misfortune. What can an Epicurean say in response?
One possibility is to deny that the post-injury individual is the same
person as the pre-injury individual. Of course he looks the same, but there
are very plausible accounts of personal identity that would require for
continuity of personhood faculties that are missing in the post-injury
individual. Just because the man with the mind of an infant has the same
body as the pre-injury individual doesn’t mean he is the same man.
In response Nagel could raise the capacities of the post-injury
person. But he would have to be careful to ensure that he is still perfectly
contented. And if we raise the capacities to the point where he can
communicate with us and tell us that he does not feel that he is suffering, then
are we really right to insist that he has been harmed? By analogy, suppose a
formerly great athlete sincerely tells us that he is just as happy now his body
is broken down, and can give good reasons why – is it our place to correct
him, and tell him that of course he’s worse off? Does the plausibility of this
brain injury case rest on rather troubling prejudices against the mentally
challenged?
Alternatively, another tack the neo-Epicurean could take is to allow
that suffering does not have to be spelled out solely in hedonistic terms.
(Again, the Epicurean might here be departing from Epicurus, but no matter.)
The neo-Epicurean could side with Mill against Bentham and suggest that
somebody denied the possibility of experiencing higher pleasures is
legitimately suffering. This would be a hard road to take, though, because
suffering seems at least to require a negative experience, whereas this would
count as suffering merely the absence of a particular kind of positive
experience. And surely this would open the door to a rejection of the
Epicurean position that death cannot harm us, because if there’s anything that
we can be sure of in death, it’s that we will have an absence of experiences of
any kind.
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3. The Deprivation Approach
This, in fact, is the central idea behind the Deprivation Approach:
that being deprived of something positive can constitute a harm, and that
death therefore harms the one who dies because it deprives her of everything.
Thus the anti-Epicurean can allow that Epicurus is quite right to point out
that being dead will not be a cause of suffering in the traditional sense of a
painful or otherwise negative experience, but retort that one can still be
harmed by death because of the things that one will not experience on
account of being dead.
The Epicurean isn’t going to give up that easily, however, as they
are used to fighting uphill against received wisdom. In Nagel’s brain injury
case it is clear who is harmed and when he is harmed, and as we saw, it is
also necessary that identity persists through the injury for the victim to be
said to have been harmed. What are the analogues in the case of a death?
Who is harmed? When is this person harmed? What exactly is the harm?
In the case of a brain injury, we can say either that the pre-injury,
intelligent person, or the post-injury person is harmed by his current brain-
damaged state. George Pitcher dubs the parallel ‘before and after’ persons in
the case of death the ante-mortem person and the post-mortem person.10 But
not only can the ante- and post-mortem person not be one and the same,
crucially (given the termination thesis) there is no post-mortem person. How
can a non-existent individual be harmed? Thus, the ante-mortem person
appears to be the only remotely plausible subject of the harm of death. But in
what way has the living Aunt Ethel been harmed by her death?11 She isn’t
dead yet, and so has not been deprived. Hence the second Epicurean
challenge, specifying when one is harmed by death. The temptation is to say
‘at death’. But that is to define death as a single moment rather than, as we
have used the term here, the state of being dead. If the state of being dead
starts the moment a person dies, then that is also the moment that person
ceases to exist, and thus the ante-mortem person, by definition, never dies.
The ante-mortem person exists only up to the point death begins.
That suggests that if we are to claim that death is a harm, then it
must be a harm that happens to a person (the ante-mortem person) after she
ceases to exist. But if that is the case, why should she care? This is the point
at which Lucretius’ observation that we don’t care about the time before we
begin to be seems most relevant. If death harms us simply by being a state
when we are non-existent, then, presumably, exactly the same harm is
imposed on us by the vast stretch of time before we came into existence. We
don’t care about that, though, so we should have the same attitude to the time
after our deaths. Indeed, it seems downright ridiculous to suggest that the
ante-mortem person could be harmed by an absence of existence that by
definition cannot temporally overlap with her. Is it even possible for there to
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be a connection between a person and a harm committed after she has ceased
to be?
Harry Silverstein argues that it is and responds to this second
Epicurean challenge by denying the ‘temporality assumption’ which requires
that a harm to a person ‘must have a temporal location or extent at least part
of which’ is prior to her death.12 Expanding on a remark by Nagel that ‘for
certain purposes it is possible to regard time as just another type of
distance,’13 Silverstein argues that events in the future exist just as much as
events far away exist, and that thus:
A’s death coexists with A (‘in an eternal or timeless sense
of the word’ [Quine]), and is therefore a possible object of
A’s suffering, and is therefore an intelligible A-relative
evil.14
What is interesting about Silverstein’s approach is that he, unlike Nagel,
accepts a variant of the first Epicurean premise, that harm must in some sense
be connectable with suffering, or, more generally, what he calls the ‘Values
Connect with Feelings’ view.15 His variant, however, allows that a particular
event x can be viewed as a harm for person A even if it does not actually
cause suffering for her:
x can intelligibly be said to have a certain A-relative value
provided merely that it be possible, or possible under
certain conditions, for A to have the appropriate feelings as
a result of x.16
Thus, on this view, the ante-mortem Aunt Ethel can be harmed by post-
mortem event x because they coexist with each other in a timeless sense and x
is therefore a possible subject of suffering for Aunt Ethel. But it still remains
for this view to explain the harm of death itself, rather than particular events
after Aunt Ethel’s death. While one might view the moment of death as an
event, it seems odd to view the potential infinity of time one spends being
dead as a single discrete event. Moreover, even if it were legitimately seen as
such, is it possible for one to have an infinitely long event as the subject of
feelings? And finally, the third Epicurean challenge—what is the harm of
being dead—rears its head here: how is being dead a cause of suffering?
Silverstein’s response is as follows:
[T]he reason one fears death, of course, is that it shortens
the duration of one’s life; if A contracts terminal
cancer…his approaching death would typically be the
object of negative feelings precisely because of his
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awareness of the brevity of his life as a whole, and the
consequent sparsity of its content, in comparison with
alternative imaginable lives. In short, it is the ‘four-
dimensional’ ability to understand life in durational terms,
to view one’s life as a temporal whole and to make
evaluative comparisons between it and alternative possible
life-wholes which ultimately accounts for the fact that
statements of the form ‘A’s death is an evil for A’ are
commonly regarded as not merely intelligible, but true.17
That is, Aunt Ethel’s being dead is a harm to her while alive because (a) her
future death is an object of harmful feelings because of (b) the comparative
brevity of her life in comparison to ‘alternative possible life-wholes’
(henceforth PLWs) in which she lives longer.
Let us take those two elements in turn. First, Silverstein insists that
one’s death can be the object of feelings while one is alive. That is, he’s not
simply saying we are harmed by foreboding, or thinking of death in general,
but that we are harmed because our actual death (or events that happen while
we’re dead) can be the object of feelings before we die. He attempts to
support this view, with a case where a husband finds out the truth, that his
wife is having an affair with his best friend, by a report from another friend
who mistakenly thought he overheard something to that effect.18 This is a
case where, claims Silverstein, the affair is the object of the husband’s misery
without actually being the cause of it. That is, he holds a de re view of the
objects of feelings. I find this simply implausible, but am not sure how to
explain it. The best I can manage is that, while I might allow that my
statement ‘the alien with thirty arms somewhere in the universe’ might have
as its object that actual being, my feelings cannot be ‘about’ that being
without some causal connection. My feelings are about my conception of that
being. And so with my death: I cannot have feelings about my actual death
(or state of being dead), just my imagination of it, and thus on his VCF view,
I cannot be harmed by it. Suffice to say that this element of Silverstein’s view
is idiosyncratic. However the second element, the idea of that the harm of
death is in the comparative brevity of one’s actual life when compared with
other PLWs is common to several deprivation approaches.
This putative comparison conjures up images of a spectral pre-birth
Aunt Ethel entering the Supermarket of Lives and being presented with a
range of options of lives and asked to pick which one she would prefer. The
use of a fictional ‘choice position’ is reminiscent of Rawls’s Original
Position, and subject to the same kind of worries. On what grounds would
Aunt Ethel choose one life over the other? How would she know what life
she would prefer before she knows what preferences she will have? Or are
we to say that some lives are objectively better than others, and thus it does
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not matter that spectral Aunt Ethel has no preferences? And how wide a
range of choices does she have? Just two – the one where she dies her actual
death, or one where she avoids that death and meets another later on? But
how much later on? And why that one later death rather than another?
Clearly the notion of PLWs needs fleshing out.
4. Possible Worlds
One philosophically respectable way to do so is to turn to the
conceptual tool of possible worlds, as Fred Feldman (among others) makes
explicit. Leibniz is famous for his claim that we live in the best of all possible
worlds, and while that claim (savagely satirized by Voltaire in Candide) was
never popular, his idea that every possibility there was a ‘possible world’ (or,
to use the language of science fiction, parallel universe) in which it occurred.
Thus, for any death that any person meets, there are innumerable possible
worlds in which everything up to just before the moment of death is the
same, but that death is avoided. (Conversely, of course, there are innumerable
worlds where that person dies much sooner or doesn’t live at all.) Thus the
sum of PLWs would be in all those possible worlds where the person whose
death is being assessed lived at all. But how to compare them? Arguing
against Epicurus, Feldman nonetheless assumes a crude form of hedonic
calculus that he believes would be amenable to Epicurus for the sake of
argument, and because this provides a simple, objective way to evaluate in
what sense one PLW could be better than another without having to worry
about the varying preferences a person might have in each. With that in mind,
Feldman suggests the following analysis to explain the harm to himself of his
dying in a ‘plane crash:
Suppose I am thinking of taking an airplane trip to Europe.
…consider the nearest possible word in which I…die en
route to Europe on this trip…Let us suppose that that world
is worth +500 to me…Next…consider the nearest world in
which I do not die en route to Europe on this trip. The
relevant feature of this world is that I do not die a painful
and premature death in an airplane accident. Suppose I
there do live to enjoy many happy years of retirement. Let
us suppose my welfare level at that world is +1,100. [This
account] implies that my death on this trip would have a
value of -600 for me. It would be a terrible misfortune.19
There are all sorts of metaphysical questions about possible worlds, though.
For one thing, in what sense are they possible? A believer in determinism
would deny that any world other than the actual one really is possible. For
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such a person there is no distinction between physical and metaphysical
possibility. That would appear to imply that determinism commits one to an
Epicurean view of death, because you can’t be harmed by impossibilities.
Another issue is the problem of establishing transworld identity: in
what sense are all these people, some who die, some who live, Fred
Feldman? This question is contentious, and the subject of high-level
metaphysical debate. It seems odd that the harm of death, supposedly so
intuitively obvious as to make the Epicurean position absurd, should hang on
such abstract philosophising. According to the view popularised by Saul
Kripke, Fred Feldman could possibly be just about any being in any
circumstances at any time. There is a possible world in which I, sitting here
named Simon Cushing, am in fact Fred Feldman. This view of transworld
identity has disastrous implications for any Deprivation Approach that
appeals to possible worlds (henceforth PWDA), because if there is such a
wide range of possible lives for me, then it seems that the actual me, sitting
here alive, is harmed by far more than my actual death. Remember that
according to PWDA, the harm of being dead is that I am thusly deprived
things of value I have in some other possible world. But it then follows that
even sitting here alive I am currently being harmed because in some
alternative possible world I live the life of an immortal philosopher-king.
What is more, this is exactly the same kind of harm that constitutes the harm
of being dead, and, on Feldman’s crude calculus, potentially far greater. This
seems to me either a reductio of the possible-worlds deprivation account, or
the biggest excuse for whining ever. Call this criticism the Absurd
Proliferation of Possible Harms (APPH) objection.
One tack a defender of PWDA can take to avoid APPH is to try to
restrict what can count as harm so that it does not include things like being
deprived of possible great wealth. Steven Luper writes:
The explanation might lie in the distinction between harm
and misfortune. Consider that it is no misfortune for me not
to enjoy the goods genius would bring me, and it is no
misfortune to be deprived of goods when their absence is
not a misfortune for me. Also, lacking genius is not in itself
a misfortune, and yet genius is a great good. 20
Thus, while I my actual death is a misfortune for me, my actual not-being-
Philosopher-King-of-the-World (as I am in some, clearly more reasonable
and well-ordered possible world) is not. This response does seem to fit with
our use of terminology, and indeed, might seem to fit with my objection to
complaining about my non-King-ness. Strictly speaking, though, Luper’s
distinction doesn’t get rid of the Absurd Proliferation of Possible Harms, it
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just denies that many of them are misfortunes. I’m not sure how seriously to
take this: I don’t think it is much comfort if one is being harmed to be
reassured that at least one is not suffering a misfortune. Because, the fact
remains that the possible worlds model is out of step with our views in
characterizing my non-King-of-the-world-ness as harm on par with the harm
of death. For the harm of death can only be spelled out in the good things that
would have come to me in the life unlived (for it is not a misfortune to die if
the alternative is non-stop torture), and surely that meets the very definition
of ‘good possibilities’ that ‘fail to be actualised’. However, Luper’s reason
for drawing the harm/misfortune distinction is at least interesting, resting as it
does on a taxonomy of goods:
How can lacking a great good fail to be a misfortune?
Because some goods are less important for us than others,
and it is a misfortune to be deprived of a good if and only if
it is important for us to have it. But when is it important for
us to have a good? Various answers are possible. One
answer lies in the fact that it is one thing for a life to be
(merely) good, and quite another for it to be the best
(physically? conceptually?) possible life; some qualities are
requisite for a merely good life, or a life that meets the
minimal conditions for happiness, while others are essential
to the optimal life, or one that provides for a degree of
happiness that cannot be exceeded. Failing to have
(something essential to) a good life (or minimal happiness)
is a misfortune, yet failing to have (what makes for) the
best possible life (or maximal happiness) surely is not. So it
is plausible to say that the goods it is important to have, and
whose absence constitutes a misfortune, are essential
goods: items essential to a (merely) good life, or a life of
(mere) happiness.
The suggested distinction between ‘essential goods’ and non-essential ones,
(which would include my Philosopher King-ness), while also initially
plausible, cannot be sustained on a PW model. Let me explain why. I am
perfectly willing to concede that in this world I should shrug off the fact that
I don’t have Warren Buffet’s wealth and attendant influence, and regard it as
neither harm nor misfortune. But that’s because I never saw that wealth as
mine. But the PW model tells me that I am harmed because there is more of
my life that I am being deprived of because, in another possible world I (and
not just somebody similar to me) live longer. But then there is another
possible world where I do have wealth and influence to put Buffet’s to
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shame, and thus I am being denied my wealth. Not having a million dollars
that was never mine and never likely to be mine is no misfortune. Not having
a million dollars that is mine is definitely a harm and seems pretty clearly a
misfortune. Now, maybe, objectively, I don’t deserve it. But then why should
I feel that I deserve the extra years my possible counterpart outlives me by?
All this suggests a second approach the anti-Epicurean can take to
avoid APPH: to restrict the range of possible mes to rule out all but a few
worlds where things are very similar for me up to the point of death.
Feldman almost certainly has this in mind when he refers specifically to the
nearest possible worlds. Jeff McMahan spells out how ‘nearness’ of possible
worlds (which, after all, are entire parallel universes, not actual planets) could
be measured:
Let t be the time at which some person died. Our overall,
objective evaluation of how bad or good his death was for
him will be based on a counterfactual claim about what
would have happened to him if he had not died at t. Let the
antecedent of the relevant counterfactual be ‘if the entire
transitive cause of his death had not occurred….’ To
complete the counterfactual, we consult the possible world
in which the antecedent is realized which is closest to the
actual world up to t. In assessing comparative similarity,
we give nomological similarity lexical priority over factual
similarity. That is, we hold the laws of causation constant
across possible worlds. Then we simply let the future
unfold in this world in accordance with the laws that hold
in the actual world, and see how the person fares.21
McMahan thinks that this view both encapsulates and develops the intuitive
idea that ‘death is bad for a person…at any point in his life, provided that the
life that is thereby lost would on balance have been worth living,’22 where the
‘life lost’ is the life that is had by the person on the possible world that is
identical to the actual world except for the key causal factor that brought
about the death of the actual person. Does McMahan’s account remove the
counterintuitive implications of the anti-Epicurean position?
I do not think so. McMahan’s focus is on establishing the harm of a
person’s actual death. This is how he can justify comparing the actual world
to just one closest possible world, where the closeness includes as much as
possible an identical life up to the point of death. However, my complaint
against the PWDA school is that if you are going to allow that a person is
harmed because of the existence of an alternative, better life on another
possible world, then there are a lot more harms than just death, and again,
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these can be much more extensive. McMahan thinks focusing on someone’s
actual death removes the relevance of other possible worlds. But only if all
you are interested in is the question of how death harms you. This doesn’t
mean that other worlds aren’t relevant for other questions, such as how not-
being-born rich, or not having world-beating basketball skills or what-have-
you harms you. So the limiting of worlds is not accomplished by the other
worlds being somehow irrelevant to you or not actually evidence (according
to the assumptions of the possible worlds approach) of harm to you, but
merely because of the particular question he was interested in. The APPH
objection remains un-rebutted.
Furthermore, while McMahan sees the specificity of his account to
be strength – he is able to explain why someone’s actual death is bad for her,
and is able to account for why some deaths are worse than others – I think it
means that he has not really explained the harm of being dead. In fact, if his
account succeeds in showing that anything is bad for a person, it is the cause
of her actual death, rather than the death itself, for the cause is the difference
between the actual world and the ‘nearest’ possible world with which it is
compared. As a result, McMahan has to contort his account in cases where
death would result almost instantaneously from another cause (say, my actual
death was one bullet of many in a firing squad) lest people who die in those
circumstances be harmed much less by their deaths than those whose deaths
are not causally overdetermined.
In sum, McMahan has not successfully delimited the number of
possible life-wholes that one should compare oneself with to find out how
much one is being harmed, and thus his view, as much as any of the possible
life-wholes views subjects actual people to potentially infinite harms in its
attempt to make being dead a harm to the living.
5. Accounting for Injustice
That’s all very well, the anti-Epicurean can respond, but the
Epicurean position has far worse implications, most notably that you do not
harm a person by killing her. Not only that, but eschewing possible-worlds
talk deprives the Epicurean of the apparatus to explain all kinds of harms,
including, in particular, injustice. Earlier I compared Silverstein’s alternative
life-wholes to the possible worlds a party in Rawls’s Original Position
contemplates, and it certainly seems that views like his make use of
counterfactuals to explain the injustice of actual institutional arrangements or
distributions. If I am disallowing comparisons across possible worlds, can I
no longer account for actual people suffering injustice?
Here is my suggestion: one does not suffer injustice because there is
a possible world in which one is better off (in justice-relevant ways). One
suffers injustice because one is not better off in this one. This is an incredibly
Don’t Fear the Reaper
______________________________________________________________
136
crude characterisation, and I cannot hope to do justice to the topic of justice
in such a short space, but let me explain what I mean.
There are two ways in which injustice might be taken to be
comparative. One way is that I suffer injustice if things could have gone
better (in the relevant justice-relative ways) for me in another possible world.
Here the possible world would have to be relatively near: if it is one where I
am some amalgam of Johnny Depp, Einstein and Pele, the injustice seems
trivial. But that leaves the possibility that, in fact, although I suffer in the
actual world, there is no near-enough possible world that both preserves my
identity sufficiently and in which I am better off. On this account of injustice,
I do not suffer it. Positively Panglossian. The alternative suggestion for the
relevant comparison is to some ideal of justice that perhaps is impossible to
attain amongst humans. This would allow that the best of all actually possible
human worlds would still exhibit injustice. I am inclined to think this is the
correct view: that even Heaven on Earth could be unjust.
In these foregoing remarks I have been discussing justice in a purely
distributive sense. There is also another, more personal, sense of injustice, the
kind that more closely fits a Nozickian model than a Rawlsian one. Here I am
done an injustice if somebody deprives me of something (however abstract)
that is rightfully mine. But this kind of injustice concerns wrongs, not harms,
and, moreover, does not require possible worlds to account for it. In fact,
possible worlds talk might have counter-intuitive results. Consider the
argument against restitution to the descendents of slaves, that in fact they are
better off than they would have been had they stayed in Africa. That, even if
true (and of course it does not apply to the non-descendents of the people
who died childless in the crossing) is surely beside the point: it was wrong to
enslave people, even if they fared better than their possible non-enslaved
counterparts. (Well, the deprivation theorist could say, they were deprived of
their freedom, and there is a possible world in which they were not. But what
if their country was in a civil war and they would have died?)
That one can be wronged even if one is not harmed by death: if I
murder someone, I wrong him because he has the right of self-determination
that my action robs of its essential basis. I have no right to embark on the
course of action that causes that right to be annulled. That is the sense in
which I wrong the living person before he dies. There is no mystery as to
when this wrong occurs – it occurs as I act intentionally, and thus the victim
of the wrong is the ante-mortem person, wronged simultaneous to my act. As
I mentioned earlier, I take this to be parallel to the case of a person being
wronged by a betrayal of which he is oblivious.
I am fairly certain Epicurus would not be happy with my suggestion
that there are some wrongs that can be done with no accompanying harm.
And he is probably not alone. Am I just turning this into a dispute over
terminology? Well, not really. I deny that one is wronged or harmed by being
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dead, but further deny that this undercuts the wrongness of killing. More
broadly, I deny that one is harmed by being deprived of something, while
allowing that the person who deprives me of it may thereby wrong me. Even
further: there might be social systems where I am neither wronged nor
harmed, but where the system is still unjust because it falls short of some
ideal.
To recap, then: I do not believe that the Epicurean challenge has
been met by the various writers who have attempted it. In particular,
possible-world deprivation accounts are in the unenviable position of
claiming that the living suffer the deprivation of being dead, and the use of
possible worlds to characterize actual harms opens the door to horrendously
implausible claims about the harms we suffer because of our myriad possible
selves.23
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least reaching across to the land of the living to exact revenge. That is, the
stories cheat by allowing an existing party to experience the betrayal.
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the living.
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17 ibid, op. cit., p. 116. While I have lumped Silverstein in with proponents
of the so-called standard argument, Silverstein is adamant in distancing his
position from the standard anti-Epicurean view, because that approach makes
the fatal mistake of suggesting that death is a loss to the non-existent dead
person. His view, he insists, entails a coherent ‘life-life’ comparison instead
of an incoherent ‘life-death’ comparison. However, in my opinion his view is
just a more respectable fleshing out of the deprivation idea.
18 ‘The Evil of Death Revisited,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIV,
2000, pp. 123-4.
19 F Feldman, ‘Puzzles About the Evil of Death,’ Fischer, op. cit., pp. 316-
317.
20 S Luper-Foy, ‘Death’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring
2006 Edition, EN Zalta (ed), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/
entries/death/>, section 4.3.
21 J McMahan, ‘Death and the Value of Life,’ Ethics 99, October 1988, p. 48.
22 ibid. p. 58.
23 H Silverstein insists that his account is different from the ‘standard’
deprivation accounts, specifically because future events (on his view) can be
the objects of the feelings that constitute a harm to the living (and, recall, this
is so even if in fact one experiences no actual adverse feelings). He attempts
to support this case in ‘The Evil of Death Revisited,’ Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, XXIV, 2000, with a case where a husband finds out the truth,
that his wife is having an affair with his best friend, by a report from another
friend who mistakenly thought he overheard something to that effect (123-4).
This is a case where, claims Silverstein, the affair is the object of the
husband’s misery without actually being the cause of it. That is, he holds a de
re view of the objects of feelings. I find this simply implausible; while I
might allow that my statement ‘the alien with thirty arms somewhere in the
universe’ might have as its object that actual being, my feelings cannot be
‘about’ that being without some causal connection. My feelings are about my
conception of that being. And so with my death: I cannot have feelings about
my actual death (or state of being dead), just my imagination of it, and thus
on his VCF view, I cannot be harmed by it.
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